Fiscal Federalism and Its Discontents: Theory and Policy by Moges, Abu Girma
Western Michigan University
ScholarWorks at WMU
International Conference on African Development
Archives Center for African Development Policy Research
6-2005
Fiscal Federalism and Its Discontents: Theory and
Policy
Abu Girma Moges
A&A OPTIMUM SOLUTIONS, ABU_GIRMA@HOTMAIL.COM
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.wmich.edu/africancenter_icad_archive
Part of the African Studies Commons, and the Economics Commons
This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for
African Development Policy Research at ScholarWorks at WMU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in International Conference on African
Development Archives by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at
WMU. For more information, please contact maira.bundza@wmich.edu.
WMU ScholarWorks Citation
Moges, Abu Girma, "Fiscal Federalism and Its Discontents: Theory and Policy" (2005). International Conference on African
Development Archives. Paper 86.
http://scholarworks.wmich.edu/africancenter_icad_archive/86
Fiscal Federalism and Its Discontents: Theory and Policy 
Abu Girma Moges 
A&A OPTIMUM SOLUTIONS® 
305-0861 Ibaraki, Tsukuba Science City, Japan 
 
[Paper prepared for the 3rd EAF-EARO/CADPR-WMU International Symposium on 
Ethiopian Development Studies, June 17-18, 2005, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia] 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: A number of countries have pursued fiscal decentralization within a broad 
context of political and economic reforms to improve the performance of their public 
sector. Fiscal decentralization can potentially improve the allocation efficiency of the 
public sector and increase the capacity of a nation to address its pressing economic, 
social and political problems. The sustainability of such an approach is conditioned by 
the existence of effective democratic institutions and implementation capabilities.  When 
political imperatives dictate the adoption of fiscal decentralization, however, the process 
would confront problems of the commons, capacity constraints and externalities that 
would limit the potential efficiency gains from decentralization on the performance of the 
public sector. This paper develops a theoretical argument on the economic rationale for 
and concerns of pursuing fiscal decentralization in a poor economy within a political 
environment of ethnic federalism. The paper discusses the current practice of fiscal 
decentralization in Ethiopia and outlines issue areas where fiscal policy could be used to 
address problem of chronic poverty, uneven regional development patterns, and improve 
the efficiency of public resource utilization.   
 
Key Concepts: Fiscal federalism, vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalances, federal 
grants, ethnic federalism, economic growth, poverty.     
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1. Introduction 
 
A growing number of countries have adopted fiscal decentralization in an 
attempt to improve the performance of their public sector. The process broadly entails 
decisions in identifying some optimal distribution of functions and powers between the 
federal and sub-national governments. This process of devolution of fiscal authority 
introduces specialization of functions, better identification of local factors, 
experimentation of democratic principles and changing the very relationship between the 
government and the citizen-voters in important ways.   
 
Fiscal federalism is essentially the choice and distribution of fiscal 
decision-making power across multi-leveled governments. The experiences of reforming 
countries have been diverse and do not allow easy generalization. The practices of fiscal 
decentralization have diverse features and maturity across countries and yet exhibit a 
common departure from the practice of centralized fiscal system. The Centralized fiscal 
policy making, where interventionist, expansionist, corrupt, and inefficient government 
policies were pursued, failed to deliver efficient public services. This overriding 
experience created the temptation in a number of countries to experiment with some 
forms of decentralization of both political and fiscal power. Some countries implemented 
fiscal decentralization whereas others opted for de-concentration of centralized decision 
making without actual fiscal decentralization (Bird, 1993; Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 
2001). In some cases, fiscal decentralization followed the political imperative of 
establishing federal political structure whereas in others fiscal decentralization was put in 
place within a centralized political regime.  
 
Fiscal decentralization has both economic and political effects. It can serve as 
one of the mechanisms to promote democratic institutions and expanding the quality, 
quantity and diversity of public services that suit the priorities of local populations. 
Nonetheless, undertaking drastic decentralization measures before local institutional 
capacity reaches some critical threshold level of policy implementation and evaluation 
capability at sub-national government levels might involve significant economic cost, 
inefficiency in resource utilization and contribute to breach of fiscal discipline (Tanzi, 
1996, Prud’homme, 1995). After all, partial decentralization may not necessarily bring 
improved governance and accountability to the people at the grass root level that 
responds to local priorities and preferences. Moreover, a professional, honest and 
politically independent bureaucracy is a critical factor in the process of improving the 
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performance of the public sector and in cultivating participatory decision making system. 
This is true both in centralized as well as decentralized fiscal regimes and yet the relative 
importance increases in decentralized fiscal setting.  
 
The dust of theoretical and empirical arguments as to why countries adopt fiscal 
decentralization and how such measures affect the objectives of public sector efficiency, 
income distribution, macroeconomic stability and economic growth performance has not 
yet settled and remains to be a lively discourse. This paper explores the theoretical and 
policy issues and conditions that shape how fiscal decentralization in an underdeveloped 
economy could help improve the performance of the public sector, achieve fiscal 
discipline, promote macroeconomic stability and economic growth. It contributes to the 
emerging theory of fiscal decentralization and the policy discourse. The theme of this 
article is that the potential benefits of fiscal federalism are conditioned on the institutions 
and political economy arrangements of a country in which decentralized fiscal decision 
making could be translated into effective instruments to address core economic, political 
and social problems.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the main 
strands of the theory of fiscal federalism and develops a political economy argument on 
issues of fiscal decentralization. Section three reviews the main features of the fiscal 
system of Ethiopia. Section four discusses issues involved in the practice of 
decentralization and their economic implications in Ethiopia. The final section draws 
concluding remarks. 
 
2. Fiscal Decentralization: Theory 
 
Fiscal federalism and decentralization derive their nature and characteristics 
from constitutional provisions as well as the level of economic development, population 
size, urbanization, ethnic fractionalization, geographical sectionalism, the pattern of 
income and resource distribution, the institutional capacity of the system, openness to 
international trade, and the interaction of political economy forces that shape the 
principal-agent relationship (Panizza, 1988, Bahl and Nath, 1986, Martinez-Vazquez and 
McNab, 2001). The constitutional provisions define the framework within which 
decision-making would be exercised and establishes the vertical and horizontal structures 
that find meaning within the prevailing socio-economic environment of the system.  
Fiscal decentralization is defined by the degree to which fiscal decision-making 
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autonomy is devolved to independently-elected and locally accountable autonomous 
sub-national governments. Fiscal decentralization and how it is practiced also affects the 
other objectives of public finance, namely income distribution and macroeconomic 
stabilization. The ultimate economic effect of fiscal decentralization on the performance 
of an economy hence depends on these interactions and how these variables influence the 
growth and distribution of income opportunities. 
 
 What are the theoretical arguments for fiscal decentralization? The theory of 
fiscal decentralization addresses three issues related to fiscal decision-making: 
assignment of responsibilities and functions between the federal government and the 
sub-national governments, the assignment of taxation power and the design of 
inter-governmental transfers (subsidies) as well as other forms of financing. These factors 
give rise to a third issue of the relative size of the public sector in the national economy. It 
is therefore the dynamics of these processes and public policy choices that ultimately 
shapes the effects of fiscal decentralization on public sector efficiency, macroeconomic 
stability and overall growth performance.   
 
2.1. Fiscal Function Assignment Issues 
 
An important aspect of fiscal decentralization is the assignment of fiscal 
functions to the federal and the sub-national governments and the appropriate means of 
financing these responsibilities. The theory of fiscal decentralization does not provide a 
clear perspective on the optimal distribution of fiscal decision making authority and how 
such decisions are related to economic efficiency, growth and income distribution. The 
broad thrust of the theory is that expenditure responsibilities in areas of macroeconomic 
stabilization and redistribution functions should remain within the domain of the federal 
government whereas allocation functions should be assigned to lower levels of 
government (Oates, 1999; Shah, 1999; Musgrave, 1983).  
 
 The conventional theoretical discourse, following the tradition of Tiebout 
framework of “voting with one’s feet”, suggests that when there is sufficient 
heterogeneity in preferences across district administrations and high mobility of 
individuals, decentralized provision of public goods leads to competition and efficiency 
in public service delivery. Oates(1977) argued that decentralization is superior to central 
solution when there is sufficient heterogeneity in local preferences and no spillover effect 
in public service provision that is financed by uniform taxation. It also admits the 
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possibility that when preferences are fairly homogeneous across districts and with weak 
spillover effects, centralized provision of public services might be more efficient.  
 
The theoretical perspective broadly indicates that fiscal decentralization and the 
assignment of functions can potentially generate economic efficiency of the public sector. 
If preferences are heterogeneous enough across jurisdictions and local public officials 
can and do respond to local demands, decentralization can improve allocation efficiency 
by tailoring services to the preferences of the local population. It follows that local 
governments are closer to the local population and can identify their choices and 
preferences better than the central government (Basley and Coate, 1999). Accordingly, 
when the decision to provide a bundle of public goods is made by local officials and these 
officials are directly accountable to the local voters, there is an incentive for the local 
officials to provide the kind and amount of services that reflect the preferences of the 
local population. Moreover, as long as there is close relation between the benefits from 
public services and taxes on the local taxpayers, there is additional incentive to utilize 
resources efficiently and cost effectively.  The decentralization theorem suggests that, 
under such assumptions and democratic political institutions, decentralization of fiscal 
decision-making authority improves allocation efficiency of the public sector.  Whereas it 
is possible for both democratic and non-democratic regimes could exercise some forms 
of fiscal decentralization, the practice sooner or later confronts tensions when democratic 
institutions are not operational and effective. 
 
Once the allocation of expenditure responsibilities is conducted according to 
such broad principles, the fiscal system needs to address the issue of assigning taxing 
power that broadly identifies who should tax, where and what (Musgrave, 1983). It is the 
devolution of taxing autonomy that gives meaning and identity to the devolution of 
expenditure responsibilities. In the context of fiscal federalism, the assignment process 
needs to identify the comparative efficiency and effectiveness of providing the fiscal 
instruments to the multi-tier decision-making centers so as to finance public functions 
and activities in the most efficient manner possible. 
 
What kind of taxes should be assigned to the federal government and which 
should be assigned to the local governments? The theory and practice in the assignment 
of taxation power identifies the following main criteria in assignment process: taxes on 
mobile tax bases, redistributive taxes, taxes that could easily be exported to other 
jurisdictions, taxes on unevenly distributed tax bases, taxes that have large cyclical 
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fluctuations, and taxes that involve considerable economies of scale in tax administration 
should be assigned to the federal government (Sobel, 1997; Musgrave, 1983; Tanzi and 
Zee, 2000, Oates, 1996). There are efficiency and equity considerations behind such 
principle of tax assignment. Local authorities should exercise taxing power on other tax 
bases within the settings and preferences of the local population. 
 
The assignment of taxing power between the federal and the regional 
governments and the provision for concurrent power to share revenues establishes the 
basic link in which the behavior of one of the parties would influence the decision making 
power of the other and its effective tax base. There is a possibility for vertical tax 
externality that might require additional policy instruments to correct their effect on other 
levels of government (Keen, 1998).  
 
  The assignment of taxing power is a thorny issue in practice and its application 
is influenced by a number of considerations. First, despite the legislative assignment of 
taxes, the actual potency of the tax network depends on the nature and development of the 
national economy, the relative distribution of economic activities across jurisdictions, and 
the administrative efficiency of the taxation system. Second, the practice of fiscal 
federalism, especially when citizens across regions with diverse economic and 
demographic situations are treated unequally, gives rise to the violation of one of the core 
principles of horizontal fiscal equity. Third, despite the monopoly of taxing power resides 
at the disposal of the government, the reach of the taxation network depends on the 
economic circumstances of the potential taxpayers. It is therefore evident that the fiscal 
assignment issues are dependent not only on constitutional provisions but also on 
economic, political and institutional factors. 
 
2.2. Intergovernmental Transfers 
 
The distribution of the tax base and the demand for public goods does not follow 
symmetrical pattern and this gives rise to the emergence of fiscal imbalances. A number 
of reasons contribute to the mismatch between the expenditure responsibilities and the 
capacity of the lower levels of government to raise sufficient revenue to finance their 
expenditure. Vertical fiscal imbalances are the result of allocation of expenditure 
responsibilities with higher cost than the sources of revenue assigned to local 
governments. This indicates the case in which the level of revenue source 
decentralization is lower than the decentralization of expenditure responsibilities. 
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Horizontal fiscal inequity emerges usually as a result of concentration of tax bases due to 
uneven distribution of economic resources and activity across regions whereas 
expenditure requirements are spread more evenly.  
 
The problems of fiscal imbalances require measures that include the provision of 
subsidies as well as policies that promote balanced growth of regional economies and 
their taxation bases. The process of changing the taxation base of regional economies is 
slow and requires consistent policies that address the underlying sources of inequalities 
across regional economies. The most common practice is providing federal fiscal 
transfers or subsidies to bridge the fiscal gaps in the regional governments. 
Inter-governmental transfers systems, however, might generate their own problems of the 
commons. When vertical fiscal imbalance is significant and local governments depend 
excessively on the federal fiscal grants, their fiscal autonomy would be compromised. 
Moreover, local government officials and the population would have the incentive to 
maximize their federal grant receipts as long as they do not proportionately share the 
burden of taxation. Where local governments do not bear the cost of their spending 
decisions, there are incentives for them to expand their budget beyond their means. Such 
fiscal behavior commonly leads to excessive growth of the public sector in the economy 
as well as a tendency to over fishing the fiscal pond.  
 
Inter-governmental fiscal transfers involve two main decisions even if most 
federal systems pursue different approaches. The federal government needs to decide on 
the aggregate pool of federal grants and then the pool has to be distributed among the 
respective lower sub-national governments. The federal government can decide on the 
size of the federal grant pool based on certain parameters, on negotiations or on some ad 
hoc mechanisms. Once the pool of federal grants is decided, the distribution of such 
grants across regions or local governments follows a number of possibilities. The federal 
government may exercise discretionary decisions to distribute such resources. However, 
such discretionary allocation might be influenced by political considerations instead of 
real need for assistance at the local levels. The most conventional way is the use of some 
grant distribution formula that takes into account indicators of needs, fiscal effort and 
other factors at the sub-national government levels.  
 
 
 
2.3. Decentralization and the size of the government 
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The appropriate role and relative size of government in national economies are 
controversial and evolving political economy issues. The actual size of government in 
national economies is influenced by a number of economic, social, and political factors 
(Lowery and Berry, 1987; Rodrik, 1996; Meltzer and Richard, 1981).  
 
Does fiscal decentralization have influence on the size of the government? The 
theoretical link between fiscal decentralization and the relative size of the public sector in 
national economies remains murky. The public finance theory traditionally identifies 
forces that shape the extent of government intervention in a national economy. These 
forces include market failure, imperfect information, incomplete market, externalities, 
public goods and significant unemployment of resources (Ehadie, 1994; Grossman, 1989; 
Rodden, 2003). The possible impact of fiscal decentralization on the overall size of the 
public sector is moderated through a number of factors such as political institutions, 
constitutional limits, the extent to which the cost of providing public services is 
internalized at local levels, ideological position of the government in power, the 
autonomy of local governments, and the level as well as growth of national income.  
 
The process of fiscal decentralization can potentially improve efficiency in the 
provision of public goods by identifying the preferences of local population and 
internalize the cost within the same jurisdiction. When political institutions enforce 
accountability and local officials are responsible to the local constituency, there is 
incentive for decision makers to achieve goals that are in line with the preferences of the 
local population. The internalization of the cost of public service provision would also 
provide extra incentive to discipline fiscal decisions and operate within hard budget 
constraint. If the expenditure choice of local governments is linked to taxation on the 
local population, there would be strong reason to maintain fiscal discipline and operate 
towards a smaller and efficient government size. However, when an increasing share of 
local government expenditure is financed by inter-governmental subsidies and devolution 
of function is not accompanied by reduction of expenditure at the federal level, there is a 
tendency for faster growth in the size of the government (Rodden, 2003). This might lead 
to the expansion of the public sector without improving the quality of public services and 
the efficiency of the public sector. The effect of fiscal decentralization on the size and 
growth of the government therefore depends on the nature of fiscal federalism pursued in 
the system. 
The theory of fiscal decentralization and its relation with economic policy issues 
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is a growing field of research whose framework is evolving to guide and inform public 
policy discussions. How the process of fiscal decentralization is related to the size and 
efficiency of the public sector and how such relations influence national economic 
performance are topical issues of theoretical and policy interest. Fiscal decentralization 
has potentials to improve the efficiency of public resource utilization and such an 
efficient government creates the environment for fast and shared economic growth in the 
national economy. In the next section, we discuss the performance of the fiscal sector and 
the practice of fiscal decentralization in the Ethiopian economy.     
 
3. Features of the Ethiopian Fiscal System 
 
The fiscal system of Ethiopia has historically been characterized by high 
centralization and concentration of fiscal decision-making power at the center. Table 1 
summarizes the main features of fiscal aggregates of Ethiopia for the past three decades. 
It depicts how surprisingly stable the fiscal aggregates have been over the years. The 
nature and structure of the economy, the resulting tax bases, the excessive dependence on 
international trade taxes and external grants, and persistent deficits all contribute to the 
prevailing features of the fiscal sector as do the fiscal policy stance of the government. 
The economy has failed to achieve any meaningful structural transformation and fiscal 
aggregates reflect this general feature.    
 
For the period 1974/75-2003/04, the government sector on average extracted 
about 18.5 percent of GDP from the economy and spent about 28.5 percent of GDP. The 
allocation to recurrent spending was about 19 percent and the share of capital spending 
was about 9 percent. This behavior of excessive spending has left an average fiscal deficit 
of about 10 percent. Foreigners provided about 3 percent as charity and about 4 percent of 
GDP as loans and the remainder was financed mainly from the domestic banking system. 
A fiscal system that resorts to borrowing to cover about 36 percent of its spending 
appetite would sooner or later confront the consequence of its behavior. This behavior of 
fiscal spending has left its mark on the macroeconomic situation of the country in which 
aggregate expenditure persistently runs in excess of domestic production.  
 
 
 
Table 1- Ethiopia: The Structure of Government Revenue and Expenditure  
1974/75 – 2003/04 (As a percentage of GDP) 
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Period/ Regime Tax Non-Tax External  
Grants 
Recurrent Capital Deficit 
excl. 
Grants 
1974/5-1983/4 13.45 3.75 1.94 18.26 6.28 -7.35 
1984/5-1990/1 13.50 6.24 3.43 20.92 9.32 -10.49 
1991/2-1994/5 9.59 3.89 2.80 14.86 7.52 -8.90 
1995/6-1997/8 12.37 6.33 3.04 14.91 9.20 -6.34 
1998/9-1999/00 11.84 6.99 2.84 24.17 7.76 -13.10 
2000/1-2003/04 15.43 5.10 5.77 21.03 11.74 -13.35 
1974/5-1990/91 13.48 5.14 2.77 19.74 7.97 -9.10 
1991/2-2003/04 13.00 5.51 4.06 19.02 9.69 -10.84 
1974/5-2003/04 13.12 5.41 3.73 19.20 9.25 -10.39 
Note: Figures for 1999/00 to 2002/3 are preliminary actual and for 2003/04 are budgets. 
Source: computed from Ministry of Finance and Economic Development data sources  
 
The change in government in 1991 created the environment and opportunities 
for reforms in almost all sectors of the economy. Fiscal policy reforms were undertaken 
that could shape and refocus the activities of the government sector. The first wave of 
reforms focused on demand management and improving underutilized capacity in the 
economy. And yet, there was no major and genuine shift in the policy stance of the 
government with respect to the level of intervention in the economy. The current regime 
inherited a stagnant economy and a policy regime that drove the private sector away from 
a meaningful participation and a leading role in the economy. The policy reforms during 
the 1990s partially addressed these problems and at least nominally admitted the critical 
role for the private sector. However, the regime has maintained its interventionist policy 
that has deprived the nation the emergence of a dynamic private sector and market 
oriented economic system.  
 
The reforms have had mixed implications on government revenue collection and 
expenditure allocation patterns of the public sector. The amendment in the tax codes, 
devaluation and gradual depreciation of the exchange rate, introduction of new taxes and 
expansion of the tax bases, and the privatization process all have had important 
implications on the amount and structure of government revenue. The overall share of tax 
revenue to GDP is not unduly high relative to developing countries (Tanzi and Zee, 2000). 
The share of government revenue indicates resource extraction from the economy and the 
command the government exerts on the rest of the economy. The state of economic 
development, the tax base, degree of monetization and marketable surplus, and the design 
and efficiency of tax administration in the country has limited the growth of the 
government sector relative to the other sectors as well as the economy. The government 
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sector, nonetheless, has exhibited expenditure expansion faster than revenue generating 
capacity of the economy. This in a way positioned the government to resort to alternative, 
though more distortion creating forms of revenue generation schemes. Despite its relative 
small size, the fiscal system of Ethiopia is typically intrusive and restrictive in nature 
creating hurdles for private investment, weakening the domestic saving effort, stifling 
competition and dampening cooperation, and in the process affecting the sustainability 
and pace of economic growth in the country.  
 
The current government in power shares important characteristics and behavior 
in fiscal policy with its predecessor. Despite marginal changes in some aspects of the 
fiscal components, there has not been enduring and significant shift in policy. The current 
regime spends about 29 percent of GDP and extracts from the economy about 19 percent 
of GDP in the form of taxes and non-tax revenues. Foreigners provide about 4 percent as 
grants and lend about 3.7 percent of GDP. The remainder of about 2.4 percent of GDP has 
been financed from domestic borrowing. This is as stable as a fiscal aggregate can get. 
The current fiscal system of Ethiopia exhibits departure from as well as striking 
continuities with the previous fiscal policy regime. The data indicates that either the 
current regime is not willing to fundamentally change its fiscal policy stance or the fiscal 
system is governed by the structural features of the economy that are not easily amenable 
to fiscal policy reforms. A closer examination of the main features of the fiscal system 
suggests that both factors play a role in the process.  
 
The result of such features of government revenue and expenditure has been the 
emergence of persistent fiscal deficits and the accumulation of public debt. Domestic 
government revenue apparently has recently been barely enough to cover recurrent 
government expenditure let alone to generate resources for financing capital expenditure. 
The level of deficit has increased and recently even surpassed the total tax revenue 
collection. Such a stance of fiscal policy is unsustainable and external grants, even if 
important to partially narrow the gap, would not and could not resolve the problem. The 
government has increased its appetite for borrowing from foreign sources to bridge the 
gap and, when external borrowing does not satisfy, it resorts quite liberally to borrow 
from the domestic banking sector. 
  
The fiscal performance of the country is a reflection of a typical underdeveloped 
and agrarian based economy in which the majority of the population lives in chronic 
poverty and a government that devotes its effort to extraction of resources from the 
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economy. This is accompanied by failure to allocate these resources to priority areas and 
sectors of the economy. However, both political imperatives and changes in the overall 
economic policy of the country opened the door for fiscal policy innovation. The fiscal 
situation and the overall economic performance of the country call for even more 
innovative and effective approaches that maximize the efficiency of using economic 
resources for addressing pressing national problems.  We will focus our discussion on 
fiscal federalism and its implication on the exercise of fiscal policy. 
 
4. Fiscal federalism in Practice 
 
 The policy of fiscal federalism in Ethiopia has followed the political imperatives 
of establishing an ethnic federalist structure. The overthrow of the military regime of 
Ethiopia in 1991 by a coalition of rebel forces set the stage for a drastic shift in the 
political landscape of the country. The process culminated in the formalization of the 
ethnic-territorial federal structure of government with the adoption of the Constitution of 
the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia in 1994. The Constitution formalized the 
experiment of ethno-linguistic based structure of government into a federal structure. 
Nonetheless, the Constitution shares essential features from former constitutional or legal 
provision in practice in the country. The very spirit of these Constitutional provisions and 
their genuine nature has been limiting individual citizens and hence the society in the 
exercise of their political and economic rights and freedoms. Instead of limiting the 
actions and powers of the government sector, which is a defining feature of a democratic 
constitutional setting, the governments were allowed to exercise and often times abuse 
political power under the veils of constitution. This interaction of political and economic 
issues is no where more apparent than in fiscal policy and practice.      
 
The Ethiopian federal structure consists of nine regional states and two chartered 
city administrations. The administrative structure divides the nine regional states into 70 
Zones and 550 Woreda (districts) with elected councils creating a four-tier level of 
government. The Woreda serves as the basic unit of administration. Moreover, there are 
municipalities in urban areas undertaking both taxation and public service provision 
decisions. The devolution process is still in progress and has not yet fully reached the 
Woreda levels of government. The system is moving towards a three-tier structure of 
decentralization: federal, regional and Woreda levels. This structure creates a 
principal-multi-agent setting in the political and fiscal relationship in the country. 
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The Constitution divides responsibilities under the jurisdictions of the federal 
government and the regional governments. It provides extensive decision-making 
legislative and executive powers and responsibilities to the regional states. The most 
notable ones are: enactment of state constitution and laws; formulation and execution of 
economic, social and development policies, strategies and plans; administration of land 
and other natural resources in the territory; levy and collection of taxes assigned to the 
regional states; designing standards for state level civil services and payment; and 
maintenance of state level security forces. The Constitution reserves all powers not 
provided to the federal government to the regional governments. 
 
What are the implications of such changes in the political and policy 
environment in terms of the design and implementation of fiscal policy in the country? 
Fiscal federalism in Ethiopia has been put in place within the dictates of political 
imperatives. One of the effects of the redrawing of the political map of the country is 
forming extremely heterogeneous economic regions. Unlike a system in which resources 
can easily flow across regions, the ethnic based political boundary establishes 
administrative, institutional and political restrictions for a full realization of the economic 
potentials of the country.  
 
The federal structure of Ethiopia carved regional states that exhibit significant 
variations and heterogeneity. These diverse circumstances of regional states have given 
rise to horizontal fiscal imbalances. The regional distribution of revenue sources is such 
that most regions could not generate enough revenue to cover their expenditure 
responsibilities. For the period 1993/4 – 2003/04, the regional states as a group managed 
to finance on average only about a third of their expenditure from their own revenue 
sources. Depending on financing mechanisms and options to externalize regional fiscal 
deficits, such regional fiscal imbalances pose risk for macroeconomic stability and the 
efficiency of public resource allocation and utilization. 
 
One of the yardsticks to evaluate the efficiency gains from fiscal 
decentralization is the extent to which it has enabled regional states to tailor their fiscal 
resources to the needs and priorities of the local population. Have they managed to 
identify the local preferences for public goods and reflect them in their budgetary 
allocations? The Constitution and related laws provide the framework for the assignment 
of revenues and expenditure responsibilities between the federal government and the 
regional governments. The Constitution defines the powers and responsibilities of the 
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federal government that broadly include areas that have national public goods character. 
Regional governments have responsibilities that are critical in the provision of public 
services that influence standard of living in the regional economies, such as the provision 
of health and education services, the provision of core regional infrastructure, the 
promotion of investment and growth in the regional economies. There has been a 
remarkable increase in the share of expenditure on social and economic services and this 
is conducted mainly through regional fiscal budgets. The shift partially indicates the 
change in the fiscal resource allocation preferences of the government whereas the 
decentralized decision making further enabled regions to put increasing emphasis on such 
expenditure in their fiscal resource allocation.   
 
The Ethiopian Constitution defines the assignment of tax and non-tax revenue 
sources to the regional and the federal governments (Proclamation No. 1/1995: Art. 96, 
97, 98). This assignment provides exclusive right for the federal government to tax 
international trade and the dominant share of domestic indirect taxes. These two sources 
have on average a combined share of about 64 percent of the tax base. Hence, the most 
potent source of tax revenue is assigned to the federal government. The regional 
governments are assigned with the collection of direct taxes within their jurisdictions, 
land use fees, and taxes on a subsistence based farm households. Moreover, the federal 
government collects payroll, sales taxes and non-tax revenues from public enterprises 
owned by the federal government irrespective of their location across the country. The tax 
base allocated to regional governments generates relatively meager revenues and is 
relatively stagnant with a property of low buoyancy. The situation is more or less similar 
with respect to non-tax revenue sources in which the federal government collects about 
80 percent of non-tax revenue of the fiscal system. The combined regional share of 
revenue collection has remained within a range of 12 to 20 percent of total revenue and 
further declining in recent years.  
 
The state and distribution of economic activities across the country has exerted 
its influence on the regional distribution of revenue in the new framework of fiscal 
federalism. The vertical fiscal imbalance is accompanied by concentration of revenue 
mobilization capacity across regions. Relatively prosperous city administrations coexist 
with extremely poor and fiscally and economically dependent regions. Table 2 depicts the 
summary indicators of horizontal fiscal imbalances in the country. It exhibits 
considerable variation across regions.  
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 Table 2: Ethiopia: Elements of Regional Horizontal Imbalances 
Characteristics/ 
Regional 
Governments  
Population 
Share (%) 
Area 
Share 
(%) 
Own-Revenue 
per capita 
(Birr) 2000-01 
Poverty 
Index 
1999/00 
Regional 
Fiscal 
Imbalance 
(%)2000-01 
Gambela 
Afar 
Benisha-Gumuz 
Somali 
0.35 
2.03 
0.88 
3.55 
2.40 
7.07 
4.30 
19.82 
35.6 
12.7 
24.2 
8.2 
0.51 
0.56 
0.54 
0.38 
5.40 
6.36 
7.15 
8.31 
Harari 
SNNPRs 
Amhara 
Tigray 
0.26 
19.84 
26.48 
6.02 
0.03 
10.28 
17.34 
5.53 
54.0 
11.5 
11.3 
20.8 
0.26 
0.51 
0.42 
0.61 
12.04 
16.38 
17.36 
18.39 
Oromiya 
Dire Dawa 
Addis Ababa 
35.89 
0.50 
4.02 
33.05 
0.15 
0.04 
15.2 
71.7 
409.5 
0.40 
0.33 
0.36 
20.91 
37.66 
79.27 
Ethiopia/Regions 100.00 100.0 13.8 0.44 46.11 
Note: The regions are ranked by the degree of their fiscal imbalance during 2000/01.  
Sources: Ministry of Finance & Economic Development; FDRE (2002); World Bank, 
2001. 
 
 Despite considerable horizontal fiscal imbalances across regions, even relatively 
prosperous regions have problems providing essential public services to its constituents. 
This issue touches three important elements in the current fiscal policy of the country. 
First, the federal government needs to reconsider its fiscal policy and facilitate directly 
the provision of basic public services to all households irrespective of their residence 
across regions instead of just leaving the matter to financially dependent regional 
governments. This is justified on the ground that even in Addis Ababa, where the own 
revenue is relatively high, about a third of its population live under the national absolute 
poverty line with limited access to basic public services. Second, if the current 
arrangement is to continue, it is imperative that in the allocation formula of federal grants, 
proper weighting is attached to the actual contribution of regions to the tax base of the 
revenues of the federal government. The third alternative might involve changing the 
relative weight of federal grants distribution in favor of poverty indictors and 
consideration to include public sector financing of basic necessities to poor households.      
 
 
 
Table 3: Vertical Fiscal Imbalances in Ethiopia [1993/94 – 2003/04] 
Category/ Combined regions’ Combined regions’ share Vertical 
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Year share of revenue (%) of expenditure (%) Imbalance*  
1993/94 
1994/95 
1995/96 
1996/97 
1997/98 
17.8 
15.4 
16.6 
18.0 
19.7 
34.5 
38.3 
41.2 
42.5 
39.6 
0.4841 
0.5979 
0.5971 
0.5765 
0.5025 
1998/99 
1999/00 
2000/01 
18.0 
18.3 
18.0 
30.5 
23.3 
33.4 
0.4098 
0.2146 
0.4611 
2001/02 
2002/03 
2003/04 
15.3 
13.4 
12.6 
30.8 
30.4 
32.0 
0.5032 
0.5592 
0.6063 
1993/4-2003/04 16.65 34.23 0.5136 
Note: *-The vertical Imbalance index is computed as: VI = {1-[(RR/R)/(ER/E)]} where 
RR is combined revenue of regions and R is the consolidated revenue of the government, 
ER measures the amount of combined expenditure of regions whereas E measures the 
total (federal plus regional governments) expenditure.  
Source: Computed based on data from Ministry of Finance and Economic Development 
  
The assignment of revenue sources and expenditure responsibilities between the 
federal and the regional governments is such that almost all of the regional governments 
can not generate enough own revenue to cover their expenditure responsibilities. This 
mismatch has given rise to the problem of vertical fiscal imbalances. As table 3 depicts, 
the regional governments have a combined expenditure responsibility of about 34 percent 
of total consolidated government expenditure whereas their share of own revenue was 
just about 17 percent. This is a clear indication of situation where revenue 
decentralization is by far narrower than expenditure decentralization the apparent 
consequence of which is the emergence of vertical fiscal imbalance. 
 
The extent of vertical fiscal imbalance in Ethiopia is quite high and increasing. 
The dependence of regional governments on the federal grants is so significant that 
without federal grants most of the regions could not even cover their recurrent 
expenditures. Moreover, the dominant part of their expenditure is absorbed by recurrent 
payments such as salaries and allowances, which are difficult to reduce, and leaves little 
for important anti-poverty reduction efforts. It is therefore clear that the fiscal policy 
stance of the federal government directly affects the policy choice variables at the 
regional levels despite the nominal fiscal autonomy that the regional governments seem 
to exercise.   
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Fiscal imbalances emerge from the interactions of fiscal policy stance, 
distribution of the tax base, and the state and distribution of economic development 
across the country. The government has put in place mechanisms to subsidize the fiscal 
deficits of regional governments. The magnitude and distribution of such federal 
subsidies poses two political economic issues: deciding the aggregate amount of federal 
subsidies from the total purse of the federal government and distributing this amount 
across regional governments.  
 
The Constitution, as well as the various laws related to fiscal policy, does not 
specify the absolute or relative magnitude of aggregate budgetary pool for the federal 
grant. The Constitution, (Article 90), states a general principle in which, given the 
resource constraints, policies shall be aimed to provide all Ethiopians access to health and 
education, clean water, housing, food and social security. The actual execution of such 
principle has been constrained by the budgetary allocation preference of the federal 
government. In practice, the federal government develops an envelope public expenditure 
budget. The allocation of funds between the federal and the regional governments has 
been made on an ad hoc basis combining budget requests from regions and the budgetary 
preferences and allocation decisions of the federal government. This makes the pool of 
the federal grant somewhat unpredictable from the perspective of regional governments.  
 
Once the pool of federal grants is determined in such a manner, with some offset 
adjustment for expected external aid and grants to regional governments, the federal 
government provides unconditional block grants according to a grant formula. The 
regional governments have the discretion as to detailed allocation and management of 
such federal grants. Following recent steps to decentralize further to the Woreda level, 
regions allocate un-earmarked grants to Woredas who exercise autonomy in allocation of 
such resources.  In recent years, the federal government on average provided subsides to 
regions to the extent of about 36 percent of the consolidated government revenue and 
external grants which finances about three-quarters of sub-national government 
expenditure.  
  
To address this problem of fiscal imbalance, the federal government has used 
grant formula to distribute federal grants that take into account a composite of several 
indicative variables. Table 4 depicts the summary and relative weights of these variables 
including population, composite index of level of development, sector performance and 
recently an index of poverty situation in the respective regions. The grant distribution 
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formula has been frequently adjusted to improve fair distribution of resources and 
encouraging efficiency and effort of regional governments to mobilize resources from 
local sources. The federal grant distribution formula has been amended several times to 
improve its equitable distribution and redistribution of public resources across regional 
states.  
 
Table 4-Ethiopia: Relative Weights of Variables in the Federal Grant Formula 
 
Variables 
1994 
Formula 
1998 
Formula 
2001 
Formula 
2003 
Formula 
1.Index of Population 
2.Composite Inverted Index of 
development 
3.Index of own revenue raising effort 
4. Poverty Index 
33.33 
 
33.33 
33.33 
0.0 
60.0 
 
25.0 
15.0 
0.0 
55.0 
 
20.0 
15.0 
10.0 
65.0 
 
? 
? 
? 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development 
 
Table 5 summarizes the actual share in federal grants received by regional 
governments. The distribution pattern reveals that there are important variations in the 
share of regions. However, despite the changes in the weights attached to the underlying 
variables, the actual share of regional states from the pool of the federal grant remains 
more or less the same. It implies that the most important determinant of the actual amount 
of federal grants received by regional governments is the size of pool more than how it is 
distributed across regions. This critical power remains in the firm hands of the federal 
government.  
 
When fiscal imbalances arise, regional states could bridge their finances in one 
of the three ways: levy additional charges, such as user fees and charges, to generate 
additional non tax revenue, borrow from domestic or foreign sources, and secure federal 
grants to finance their budget deficits. The practice in Ethiopia is that regions are not 
allowed to borrow and the user charges are not commonly practiced. This leaves the 
federal government grants as the dominant source to finance regional expenditure. The 
federal government also uses the fiscal subsidies to redistribute resources through the 
fiscal system. Whereas making resources available for regions that commensurate their 
expenditure responsibilities is necessary, the use of unconditional block grants for the 
purpose of resource redistribution has serious problems. Such an approach assumes the 
regional states have the capability as well as the commitment to allocate such funds to the 
purposes that reflect the preferences of the local population. This would be a critical issue 
especially when accountability is weak and centralization and corrupt practices at 
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regional levels emerge.  
 
Table 5: Ethiopia: Regional Share of Federal Grants (percentage share) 
   Year 
Regions 
1993/4 
 
1994/5 1995/6- 1997/8 1998/9- 
2000/01    
2001/2- 
2003/4 
Tigray 
Afar 
Amhara 
Oromiya 
Somali 
Benisha-Gumuz 
SNNPRs 
Gambella 
Harari 
Addis Ababa 
Dire Dawa 
10.58 
4.92 
20.09 
32.25 
3.09 
3.29 
15.85 
2.77 
0.83 
6.27 
0.06 
11.39 
3.29 
24.56 
28.12 
2.79 
1.47 
20.51 
2.46 
1.33 
3.94 
0.13 
9.52 
4.88 
24.00 
29.01 
5.04 
3.86 
18.58 
2.54 
1.69 
0.38 
0.63 
7.61 
6.85 
21.80 
27.34 
9.00 
4.76 
16.07 
3.97 
1.76 
0.01 
0.82 
7.68 
4.72 
21.58 
30.14 
7.33 
3.68 
17.95 
2.80 
1.49 
0.85 
1.78 
Average Amount 
(Million Birr) 
 
1950.1 
 
2292.7 
 
2866.1 
 
3194.8 
 
4779.9 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development 
 
If the federal grants are distributed with such provisions that commit regional 
governments to finance public services that reflect the preferences of the local population, 
then the same funds could go a long way to address critical economic and social problems. 
There is a certain degree of heterogeneity in the preferences of the local population. 
Nonetheless, in a country where poverty is widespread and basic public services are not 
widely available, basic preferences and choices are broadly similar enough to warrant 
shared, if not uniform, provision of public services across districts and even regions. 
Centralized design of the blue prints and implementation by regional states and districts 
does not exclude diversity in public service and it does not violate the autonomy of 
regions. A certain share of the federal grants could be used to bridge such critical needs 
which could also be matched by local private sector funding mechanisms. In this context, 
it would be necessary to study further the heterogeneity of preferences across regions and 
identify the minimum set of public services, subject to prudent variation, that every 
region should be able to provide irrespective of their actual capacity to generate own 
revenue.  
The current practice uses the poverty index as a yardstick to distribute federal 
grants to regional governments. However, it falls short of ensuring how such funds are 
used to improve the poverty situation of the chronically poor across the country. It is 
important to establish a mechanism that would ensure such funds be directly used to 
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create opportunities for the poor to escape poverty and in the worst cases to reduce the 
suffering of the poor from destitution. Despite the variations in the index of poverty 
across regions, it is clear that poverty is a nationally shared phenomenon that deserves to 
be the responsibility of the federal government. In a system where destitution is a reality 
and national in scope, there is strong rationale for the federal government to assume 
responsibility and design a basic social security scheme.  
  
The current practice attempts to address the problem indirectly through the 
regional administration. There are, however, limits to such an approach: First, the 
regional governments receive unconditional block grants and their decision-making 
process might not directly and necessarily reflect the preferences of poor households and 
the population in their jurisdiction. In a country where about 45 percent of the population 
lives in poverty, such indirect processes of budgetary assistance would hardly trickle 
down to the poor. Second, with such a level of vertical fiscal imbalances, regional 
governments are dependent on federal grants to carry out their expenditure 
responsibilities and funds for poverty reduction compete with projects that regional 
officials deem priority. This might not necessarily or inherently create conflict of interest, 
or it might. It is therefore justifiable, both on equity and poverty reduction considerations, 
for the federal government to directly provide social security assistance to poor 
households and the destitute.  
 
The practice of providing unconditional block federal grants to regional 
governments has important bearings on the fiscal management of regions and how 
resources would be channeled to lower levels of government. The federal grants do not 
address the intra-regions distribution of fiscal subsidies. Regional level of centralized 
decision-making and fiscal behavior is a reality that needs to be addressed in time. It 
could absorb much of the fiscal resources at the regional centers and fail to reach agents 
and purposes that justify resource redistribution through the fiscal system. 
 
 What are the main effects of the practice of fiscal federalism on the 
policy-making behavior of the public sector? The practice of fiscal federalism can affect 
the aggregate behavior and performance of the public sector in three interrelated areas. 
The first issue is related to the impact of fiscal federalism in influencing the fiscal 
discipline of the public sector. As we have already observed in the previous sections, the 
fiscal aggregates of the general government exhibit both continuity and innovation. 
Despite the reform policies, the government is still running persistent and unsustainable 
Abu G.M.: Fiscal Federalism and Its Discontents 
 
 
21  
fiscal deficit. The fact that the main driving force behind the deficits is the burgeoning 
public expenditure suggests that there is no clear turn in the policy stance of the 
government. Fiscal decentralization has played a role in the expansion of government 
expenditure. The increased execution of public expenditure by the regional governments 
and externalization of expenditure decisions has contributed to a behavior of expansive 
public expenditure. When devolution is not accompanied by reducing the responsibilities 
and fiscal resources at the disposal of the federal government, it feeds into unsustainable 
expansion of public sector expenditure.  Reorientation and reduction in federal 
expenditure are necessary so that the consolidated government expenditure remains with 
in the revenue capacity and in consistent with economic growth path of the country.    
 
 The second impact is related to public resource allocation behavior. There were 
important shifts in the allocation of public resources. The most important shift was the 
reorientation of public expenditure from defense related expenditure to social services 
and economic development expenditures. Expenditure reorientation towards health and 
education sectors improved the efficiency of public resource allocation. The practice of 
fiscal federalism contributed positively in the process since the sub-national governments 
allocated an important share of their budgets for poverty and social development oriented 
activities. However, there is a clear tendency to push expenditure responsibility to the 
sub-national governments without a commensurate allocation of revenue sources. This 
would have adverse effect both on the quantity and quality of public service provision in 
local areas where the local capacity is quite limited. 
   
 The third element of policy interest is how the behavior of the public sector and 
the practice of fiscal federalism affected the overall performance of the economy and the 
behavior of other economic agents in the system. The reorientation of the public sector to 
areas in which the private sector is reluctant to operate or market failure is predominant 
would have a crowding-in effect on the private sector. There were important shifts in the 
policy stance of the government from a policy that categorically discourages the private 
sector to that, at least nominally, encourages and acknowledges the role of the private 
sector in the economy. Policy measures were taken that opened space for private sector 
participation in various areas of economic activities. However, there are still considerable 
ways to go. Reluctance remains on the part of the government to create the policy 
environment in which self-driven private sector initiatives and market forces could serve 
as engines of economic prosperity.  
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The introduction of fiscal decentralization has had mixed effects on the 
participation of the private sector in economic activities. The practice, accompanied by 
the underlying tone of ethnic federalism, has introduced a political risk factor in the 
investment decision-making. The private sector still tends to avoid long-term investment 
activities in which routine interaction with political decision-makers and hence 
interference is unavoidable. Moreover, there are factors that encourage expansion of 
public sector consumption expenditure at the expense of capital accumulation and hence 
jeopardizing the sustainability of economic growth. It is therefore clear that despite the 
overall improvement in the policy environment in which the private sector operates the 
relative expansion of public sector consumption in the economy allowed the 
predominance of a large and yet inefficient government sector in the economy.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
Ethiopia has introduced a unique form of fiscal decentralization in the context of 
ethnic federalism. The process is still in progress that decentralization of fiscal 
decision-making power has not yet fully reached the basic unit of administration in the 
federal structure. The regional governments have been constitutionally vested with 
extensive decision-making power. However, the fact that the federal government still 
centralizes the fiscal means of executing fiscal responsibilities indicates that there is a de 
facto centralization of fiscal decision-making. This is reflected by excessive dependence 
of regionals on federal grants to finance even recurrent expenditures within their 
jurisdictions. The fiscal system is characterized by both vertical and horizontal 
imbalances that require further decentralization of revenue sources that commensurate 
the expenditure responsibilities of the regional governments.  
 
 The practice of fiscal decentralization in Ethiopia, and the political and 
economic landscape in which it operates, has so far limited success to improve the 
efficiency of the public sector by diversifying output and tailoring it to the preferences of 
the population and priorities of the economy. Given the prevailing vertical imbalance, the 
system has not made regions internalize the cost of their expenditure decisions. This in 
turn has given incentive to expansionary fiscal policy stance and bigger government. It is 
such a policy stance that erodes its sustainability, allows the breach of fiscal discipline, 
and risks macroeconomic instability, and in the process hampers the realization of 
economic potentials in the national economy. It is therefore important that the practice of 
fiscal decentralization in Ethiopia be reoriented to improve the reach and quality of public 
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services, to ensure fiscal discipline, to cultivate democratic and effective institutions and 
in the process contribute to address the fundamental economic, social and political 
challenges of the country.   
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